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MORE FRESH JUDGMENT! HOW LAW PRIVILEGES THE
UNIVERSITY
WILLIAM

MCLEAW

Court-enhanced academic independence is closely related to judicial
independence. Discussion of this relationship, however, is absent ftom most
legal discourse. The absence of this discussion amounts to a privilege for the
university in its relationship to the court. Three indicia of this absent
discussion are canvassed. First, the legal academy virtual selfignorance of its
influence on the judiciary. Second, the common law's tendency to nonconstruct the university through judicial non-interference. Third, the
judiciary's constitutional reaffirmation of university independence under the
Charter. This non-construction of the university and the absent discussion
around it point to the stake that judicial independence has in ensuring that it
can rely on an uncontaminated source ofacademic authority for support.

s

L 'independance academique est etroitement liee a l'independance des juges.
Jl n y a pas beaucoup de discussion de ce lien dans le discours juridique.
L 'absence de cette discussion constitue un privilege pour l'universite par
rapport a ses relations avec les tribunaux. Trois indices de !'absence de cette
discussion sont examines. Premierement, l'academie juridique ignore son
influence sur les juges. Ensuite, le droit a tendance a deconstruire l'universite
en ne se me/ant pas a ses affeires. Finalement, les juges ont reaffirme
l'independance de l'universite en se servant de la Charte. Cette
deconstruction de l'universite accompagne par la discussion absente qui
l'entoure indiquent que l'independance judiciare a besoin d s 'assurer qu 'elle
peut se fier a une source pure d'authorite academique

A quick survey around legal society reveals a landscape peopled
with various supplicants willing to advise and temper the sovereign's
dispensing of mercy. Naturalists, positivists, crits, feminists,
economists, marxists, social critics, liberals, conservatives,
deconstructionists, and presumably anarchists, all write and speak
to one another proposing changes, modifications, and criticisms of
t B.A. (Hons.)(McMaster), M.A. (Waterloo), LLB (Dalhousie) anticipated
1996. This paper received a].S.D. Tory Writing award for 1995.
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the "good life," if it does not offend one's neo-platonic sensibilities
to call it so; and if it does offend, then one might say the various
efforts are plainly and simply directed toward the "just." At least,
one assumes these people direct their various energies towards the
"just" through the media of discourse and instruction. One also
assumes they direct a fair share of this energy to the one present at
the adversarial moment; or, if the discourse is broader, the one at
the point of conflict; or, broader still, the one at the point of
legitimization where one's "rights" begin at the same time as
another's "rights" begin.
One might assume this direction of energies is a fair explanation
of the juridical-legal critical act unless one has good reason not to.
But failing good reason, descending into a world where reason has
to compete with context, one might remark at the absent presence
of the above players and indeed, the sovereign, at certain key points
just prior to the justiciable moment. Indeed, such a remark this
paper embarks on.
A commentator on the law, generally referred to as an
authority, speaks to and is occasionally sought out by the one
present at the adversarial moment, also generally referred to as the
authority. The site from which the commentator seeks out the law
and where the adjudicator seeks out the commentator is rarely
examined as a seat of authorizing authority. This seat is the
University, a place where legal commentators "authorize" their
work and where adjudicators look to use such work to bolster their
authority-a process of "authorizing authority." This seat of
authorizing authority is the site of a vast industry whose proximity
to the justiciable moment relegates it to the status of a prior
medium. This site is often pushed back from view by the desire for
the presence of justice at the justiciable moment: it is almost like
the vast industry is not there at all. The Derridean lexicon 1 provides
a label for that which is not there; it is called the 'absent presence:'
"Rather than the absence of full presence, absence is the prior
medium in which the desire for presence can become aware of
itself." 2 I believe the characterization of the University as a seat of
authorizing authority is rarely examined because the courts and the

1

Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1988) at 154.
2

Ibid.
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academy have constructed academic privilege to push this site back
from view.
This absent presence in the juridical-academic debate on justice
is one which needs exposing, if not for the titillation of doing so in
its own right, then for the sake of preventing theoretical gridlock.
So first, I begin with some background on the need for exposing
absence. The theoretical-critical revolution which swept the North
American academies beginning in the 1970's3 and which provided
new ways to challenge the legitimizing metanarratives of society in
general, eventually found their way to the door of the legal
academy in the form of Critical Legal Studies (cLs). For a
profession whose embrace of stare decisis and 17th-century scientific
method has just recovered from the project of assimilating l 8thcentury liberalism, 4 it is hardly surprising to note the critical
revolution was at first met with a cold, and perhaps indignant,
reception. Indeed, as late as 1988 the party line stated the legal
academy was not about to become anybody's sandbox:
The gravest problem is that Hutchinson's impatience
with and intolerance of our cultural traditions leads him
to misrepresent them and to deny their potential. In the
end, political theory has little in common with rock
music .... Political theory has more rigorous standards. 5
The critical response to this closure intensified. There were
accusations of "privilege" and the identification of a kind of truce
between two poles:
Critical legal studies, in an ironic sort of way, continues
to reaffirm the centrality of liberalism because so much
of liberalism remains at the core of the critical agenda.
The only difference is that it is no longer portrayed in its
best light. In short, crits admit it is dominant ideology. 6

E.g., the Yale School of deconstruction.
See Mahoney on the l 8th-cenrury tone of traditional liberal rhetoric. K.
Mahoney, "The Limits of Liberalism" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on
Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 1991) 57 at 64.
5 D. Gallowy, "No Guru, No Method ... " (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 304
at317.
6 R. Devlin, "Doubting Donald: A Reply to Professor Donald Gallowy's
'Critical Mistakes"' (1991) 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 178 at 205.
3
4
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The risk of such a truce is the risk of polarization between dominant
liberal ideology on the one hand and the proponents of alternative
ideologies on the other hand. The risk is perhaps better stated as the
installment of yet another dialectical process at the expense of true
polyvocality. The risk, and hence the need for exposure, is that
synthetic agreement in the prior medium will again be
overshadowed by the tensions inherent in the justiciable moment.
This brings us back to the issue of the absent presence of the
University in the juridical-academic debate on justice.
The absent presence is, quite simply, the role of the University
itself in the juridical-academic debate on justice. While the "law"
provides the ground upon which the interpretive debate takes place,
the University and the courtroom assert their presence as the
'authorized' sites at which these debates take place. The absence of
the University, however, is made conspicuous by the fact that its
presence, or its role, is rarely mentioned or acknowledged. My
project, then, attempts to problematize the very site at which the
interpretive debate takes place (whether by the liberal establishment
or the crits) by challenging the University as a place which amounts
to an academic and judicial non-construct. I submit that the nonconstruction of the University is a function of the fact that the legal
academy ignores it. The academy is protected, not by the presence
of law, but by the law's conspicuous absence via the courts'
reluctance to allow the contamination of the University
environment by the state. I assert that the non-construction of the
University bears a symbiotic relationship to the courts' own
independence as the courts look to the University as one
uncontaminated source of judicial input.
THE UNIVERSITY IGNORES ITS OWN INFLUENCE

The first indicia of how law privileges the University arises from the
proposition that the legal academy virtually ignores its own
influence. Here, I use the word "law" not to designate the
emanations of statutes or judgments, but to designate discursive
legal society, the academic legal discourse which fills in the blanks
the court will not, or cannot, fill in itself. Hence, in this section I
call this "law." This is the activity of law which privileges the
University by allowing it to ignore key aspects of itself.
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In this section of the inquiry, I look at a narrow range of
academic input into the law. This narrow range concerns the
collective legal-academic realization about the nature of law that we
see taking place in the almost decade and a half since the
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.7 Narrower still, I
am going to perform a modest archaeology upon a single aspect of
this collective realization: the legal-academic focus upon the
composition of the judiciary. The introduction of the Charter
brought greater academic focus on the increased prominence of the
role of the judiciary itself. But while an archaeology of the collective
thought on the composition of the judiciary is important in itself, I
wish to narrow my dig further still. I am not digging for the relics
of opinion on who makes up the judiciary. I am digging for the
spaces between the relics: I am looking for signs of those who do
not make up the judiciary, precisely because these same people
often are not identified as making up or influencing the judiciary.
Academics have generated quite a bit of analysis on the
composition of the judiciary. They have identified various
components of the judicial composite which I classify into two
broad categories: a) reflections on who is the judge; and b)
reflections on what or who influences the judge. Generally, the
academic deconstruction of judicial composition begins with an
elaborate construction of who is the judge. The construction of this
category usually includes identifying judges' gender (usually male);
identifying their race (usually "white," with few Aboriginal or
minority groups represented); 8 identifying their culture;9
identifying their religion; 10 and identifying the region of Canada
they represent. 11 Following upon who the judges are, is the
construction of the what or the who which influences them. This
category often includes identifying the judges' legal background
(with usually I 0 years experience to be appointed to the bench);

7 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter the
Charter].
8 See A.W. MacKay, "Judicial Free Speech and Accountability: Should Judges Be
Seen But Not Heard?" (1993) 3 N.J.C.L. 159 at 162.
9 See M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive
Monopolies, Cultural Differences," in Devlin, ed., supra note 4, 503.
IO See MacKay, supra note 8 at 168.
II Ibid.
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identifying their social class; identifying their political or economic
background (banking, commerce, or politics); 12 and, some limited
acknowledgment of their legal education. 13 Each of the above subcategories of judicial composition provides an entry point for
analyzing, deconstructing and reforming various aspects of judicial
character and influence.
Such analysis, deconstruction, and reform, however, does not
exist in a vacuum. One question is, who is the audience of this close
examination of the judiciary? The obvious answer: the audience is
the judiciary themselves, legislators and reformers, and other
members of the academic community. 14 Certainly, such work
informs judges, raising awareness of the homogeneity of the bench
and the accompanying danger of inherent bias due to singularity of
perspective. Legislators and reformers benefit from such work
because it raises public awareness of the need for debate on
increasing heterogeneity of the bench and gives legislators clear
options for increasing diversity through choosing judges whose
character, background and influences may be different from the
present norm. Such debate informs the academic community and
introduces it to new tools and avenues of legal scholarship. While it
does a good job exploring the composition of the judiciary, this
academic work on the composition of the judiciary surprisingly
lacks a comprehensive analysis of the composition of its own
audience.
Such unreflected construction of the judiciary presents us with a
gap. The academic analysis glosses over a disturbing aporia in its
rush to challenge the composition of the judiciary and expose this
to the judge, legislator, and academic. Upon examining such work,
one becomes troubled by the regular aporias, the gaps between an
individual's origin and her judicial belief; between an individual's
influences and her judicial act: these gaps are complex and worthy
of in-depth study in their own right. My project, however, is much

J. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always
Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)," in Devlin, ed., supra note 4, 445 at
450.
l3 A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45
Advocate 857 at 861.
l4 See V. Black and N. Richter, "Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of
Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990" (1993) 16
Dalhousie L.J. 377.
12
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more simplistic. My question is why does the group which creates
and receives legal commentary not include itself as an influence on
the judiciary? Why does the construction of the who and the what,
the character and the influence, not acknowledge all of the
characters, influences, and ultimately, audiences? Put simply,
despite the overwhelming presence of the academic in the
construction and audience of work on judicial composition, why is
the academic and the academy so blatantly absent when it comes to
tallying up the who's and the what's, the characters and influences
which compose the judiciary?
The above review of how the legal academy treats the question
of the composition of the judiciary reveals the conspicuous absence
of the University as a site of authorizing authority. When the
subject of the role of legal education does come up, however,
academics tend to understate the influence of the University on the
composition of the judiciary. While mention of a judge's legal
education often makes it to the list of influences on the judiciary,
the emphasis on education often mingles with other issues. Petter
notes one influence on the judiciary is "the legal system in which
they were schooled and to what they owe their livelihood." 15 While
acknowledging the role of legal education, Petter subsumes it under
a larger system which includes livelihood. This is not quite an
outright admission of the role of academic influence on the
judiciary, rather, it appears to be an influence a judge brings with
himself or herself. MacKay also comes close to acknowledging the
role of the academic by demonstrating the role of law school in
destroying emotion and feeling. 16
Bakan also refers to the law school as an influence on judicial
composition: "The homogeneity of the judiciary is also closely tied
to that of law school student populations." 17 At a later point,
MacKay comes a little closer to acknowledging the role of the
University by saying that judges will make choices as a result of
competing values and one of the sources of these values is "legal
society" . 18 The definition of legal society, however, does not clearly

15 Supra

note 13 at 861.
A.W. MacKay, "For Whom Does the Charter Toll," in Boyle et al, eds.,
Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 90 at 93.
17 Supra note 12 at 450.
18 Supra note 8 at 514.
l6
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indicate whether it includes the legal academy. One could assume
it does. The above observations of potential influences are studentoriented, however, and do not focus on the academic's role in
maintaining a program of emotional homogeneity and legal
socializing in its activities aimed at the judiciary.
Perhaps one finds the clearest admission of the role of the
University's influence on the judiciary in Black's work on the use of
academic authority in the Supreme Court of Canada. 19 This work
makes substantial inroads into examining the relationship between
the court and the university and the role of the academy in
contributing towards and constituting judgments. For example, a
bottom-line fact coming out of the work shows the Supreme Court
of Canada used academic authority in 48 percent of the decisions it
rendered during a certain period. 20 Black describes the critical value
of the work, however, in understated terms as "an initial attempt at
an empirical examination of forensic citation .... "21 Perhaps initial
attempts are necessarily quantitative, empirical, and forensic, but
this does not relieve it of an implicit critical theoretical perspective.
Indeed, Black's study embraces a critical theoretical approach when
it adopts as a "citation" the distinction "between a judge's simply
mentioning an authority and a judge's actually relying on one." 22
This distinction was widened to count as citations those judicial
references which were less than clear how much substance of the
authority was used in writing the judgment. I agree with this
approach, but would point out it reflects a critical stance whose
underlying theory says such use of citation must have some degree
of influence on the judge, so it cannot be simply explained away as
a forensic choice (i.e. a choice to cite an author's name because of a
concern for plagiarism).
Despite the inroads this research makes for a theory of the role
of the University, it still contains additional small doses of familiar
understatement of the influence of the University on the judiciary.
For example, Black mentions three Supreme Court of Canada
justices were full-time academics before their appointment to the
bench. He draws from this a tentative conclusion based on his

19

Supra note 14.
Ibid. at 382.
21 Ibid. at 378.
22 Ibid. at 380.
20
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research that this group of justices tend to write decisions
containing academic references more than their colleagues who did
not have such a pre-bench position. 23 Framing the observation this
way understates the potential influence of the academy on those
judges who were not full-time academics prior to their appointment
to the bench. Presumably, all the justices have, in addition to their
law degrees, undergraduate and possibly graduate degrees from the
academy. This should be presented as a reason why this group of
judges cite authority at all, rather than solely as a comparison with
the citation habits of their "academic" colleagues. The academic
connection with the University is too strong to understate in such a
way.
These points demonstrate that other influences and
compositional factors may contribute to the process of the judge's
role of making choices. The legal academy, as demonstrated above,
through its relative silence about its own involvement and
participation in the process, exposes an example of how "law"
privileges the University. In a backward kind of way, the legal
academy privileges itself through an apparently self-denigrating
non-acknowledgment of its own influence.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF UNIVERSITY PRIVILEGE

We move now from academic "law" and its self-privilege of the
University to a second indicia which looks at how the judiciary's
common-law treatment of the University works in some respects to
create a privileged site. In keeping with the theme of the nonconstruction of the University by law I have dug up examples which
show the tendency of the courts not to interfere with the operation
and structure of the University. I relate this tendency to the
Derridean absence of force:
'to enforce the law,' which always reminds us that if
justice is not necessarily law (droit) or the law, it cannot
become justice legitimately or de jure except by

23

See Black, 47% vs. 40.1 %, Ibid. at 387.
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withholding force or rather by appealing to force from its
first moment, from its first word. 24

The net effect of the law on the site of authorizing authority
withholds force from the realm of the University, hence allowing it
the privilege, not to be threatened, but to be non-constructed by
the law.
One example concerns the legal non-construct of membership
within the University. In Paine v. The University of Toronto 25 an
unsuccessful candidate for tenure appealed the rejection of his
application for tenure, suggesting that the presence on the Tenure
Committee of a person who previously wrote an unfavourable
review of him constituted an unfair proceeding. After exhausting
internal appeal procedures, the candidate appealed to the courts. In
dismissing the appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal took the
opportunity to reiterate the court's traditional position in regard to
the University: "I cite the Harelkin case only for the proposition
that the courts should be reluctant to intervene in University
affairs. " 26 Indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged it
was merely upholding the position of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Harelkin:
the incorporation of a university by statute does not alter
the traditional nature of such an institution as a
community of scholars and students enjoying substantial
internal autonomy.... The courts should use restraint and
be slow to intervene in university affairs by means of
discretionary writs whenever it is still possible for the
University to correct its errors with its own institutional
means. 27

The courts' reluctance to intervene in University affairs because they
regard the University as autonomous amounts to a non-application
of the law to its functions and allows the University constructive
freedom to constitute its membership as it sees fit.

J. Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'," Cornell
et al, eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility ofjustice (New York: Routledge, 1992)
3 at 10.
25 (1982), 34 O.R. (2d) 770.
26 Ibid. at 774.
27 Ibid. at 774.
24
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The court's reluctance to interfere in the University extends
further to certain types of communication within the University.
Communications which concern the tenure process are uniquely
protected by the courts if they are confidential in nature. In
Slavutych v. Baker 28 the court granted evidentiary privilege to a
communication concerning a candidate's tenure appointment.
Here, the court created a new category of privileged confidential
relationships because it was unwilling to interfere in the
administration of the University. The uniqueness of this
development was the subject of comment by Justice Sopinka in his
text: "the reality is that apart from the rather rare relationship in the
Slavutych case, no communications within any other class of
identifiable relationship have been explicitly sheltered. " 2 9 This
development in the law of evidence also has the effect of making
the law 'absent' in this type of University situation by not subjecting
such evidence to the process of adjudication, which would,
necessarily, invoke the presence of the court.
These cases appear to illustrate a reinforcement of the publicprivate distinction when it comes to Universities. The court will
protect its private nature at common law, but will also go much
further to make some of the private activities of the University nonjusticiable.
THE DISJOINTED METANARRATIVE OF
MCKINNEY

A third indicia of how law privileges the University arises out of the
operation of the Charter. One finds a good example of the ultimate
disjointed metanarrative in McKinney v. University of Guelph30 with
its sweeping review of Charter application, early retirement, and the
University. I wish to focus on this latter part to demonstrate how
McKinney non-constructs the University.
The McKinney story begins at the question: Does a University
professor have to retire at 65? Along the way, the court cites the
law's familiar hands-off approach to the University from Harelkin.

28
29

[1976] 1 S.C.R. 254.

30

[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.

J. Sopinka, S. Lederman & A. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 632.
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The story then reaches the disjointed conclusion to the retirement
question: Yes, the professor has to retire because a University is not
a government actor, but if it was a government actor, then most
certainly a Charter violation would be involved, and she might not
have to retire. The Supreme Court of Canada constructs its own
metanarrative over the basic question of early retirement with a long
examination of the relation of University to government (in the
process, leaving the issue of mandatory retirement far behind).
McKinney reaffirms the University's privilege of autonomy which
La Forest J. describes as follows:
The legal autonomy of the universities is fully buttressed
by their traditional position in society. Any attempt by
government to influence university decisions, especially
decisions regarding appointment, tenure and dismissal of
academic staff, would be strenuously resisted by the
universities on the basis that this could lead to breaches of
academic freedom.31

The University's core functions regarding decisions on
appointments, tenure and dismissal go to the heart of academic
freedom and help explain the rationale behind Paine and Slavutych.
What makes this case remarkable is the strain it puts on the
traditional judicial project of preserving the independence, and thus
the privilege, of the University under (or in the absence of) the law
and the postmodern flourish with which it does this. The strain is
evident through La Forest J.'s use of the curious technique of
proceeding with the examination of the University's policy based
on a hypothetical situation of what would happen under the Charter
if the University were a government actor. Under the hypothetical,
La Forest J. finds that the core Canadian document of rights and
freedoms would be violated. The magnitude of the constitutional
violation is further enlarged by the tenuous connection of how close
the University came to being considered a government actor. So
tenuous, in fact, that La Forest J.'s 'core functions' of a University
have recently come under governmental attack. 32 Indeed, as if La
Forest J.'s tenuous hypothetical was not enough, Wilson J., in
3 1 Ibid. at 273.
3 2 Under Alberta

government cutbacks, the inference is that the University is still
free from government interference, but tenure obligations will not longer be a way
to justify resistance to provincial budget cuts.
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dissent, finds not one, but three indicia by which she could construe
the University as a government actor, thereby drawing further
attention to the magnitude of La Forest J.'s decision on the status
of a University.
As mentioned, McKinney carried on the law's tradition of
privileging the University. The difference here, however, is how
strongly the context of constitutional rights draws attention to the
court's privileging of the University. This context places the
Supreme Court of Canada squarely within the postmodern context
of revealing the structural composition of things. Here, the
Supreme Court of Canada is exposed making distinctions about
what is in and out of Charter scrutiny based on a very fine line. This
exposure is like playing what one might describe as a type of game
of 'chicken' by seeing how close they can come to finding the
University's connection to government with a potential violation of
the supreme law of Canada at stake, but nevertheless still finding
that a University is not a government actor. Indeed, as if the point
was not made adequately enough about the lengths to which the
court will go to protect the independence of the University, this
project was carried on in subsequent cases. In Harrison v. UBC 33, La
Forest J. again found the University was a government actor despite
the fact that the government appointed a majority of board
members and required various reports.3 4 Indeed, to further
articulate and define the privileged place of the University, the poor
cousin of the University, the Canadian college, was held to be a
government actor, thereby delimiting the University's role further
in Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College. 35
The poor cousin community colleges were found to have
aspects which amounted to government actions or "law." Indeed in
Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union 36 La Forest ].
goes quite far in defining the extent of government involvement to
include efforts to "stimulate and preserve the community's
economic and social welfare."3 7 This, however, does not extend to

(1990] 3 S.C.R. 451.
D. Jones and A. de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 2d. ed.
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1994) at 44.
35 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570.
36 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
37 Ibid at 374.
33

34
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the community's intellectual underpinnings, which are safe from
Charter scrutiny while confined to the site of the University.
Overall, the result is that the Supreme Court of Canada has
'constitutionalized' the privileged place of the University within the
law. Indeed, the constitutional analysis fundamentally relies on the
court not finding law to which the Charter can apply! This allows
the site an authorizing authority, a freedom to develop because of
the absence of law or force.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACADEMIC
INDEPENDENCE

Bringing together the threads of how "law" privileges the University
we see three main indicia: academic self-ignorance, common law
non-construction via non-interference, and a constitutional
reaffirmation of independence. One "hurdle" we have to get over in
trying to infer a relationship between these indicia and their
tendency to construct a privileged place in "law" for the University
is the substantive topics which these indicia relate to and stand for.
For in the legal "scheme" of things, the decisions and academic
commentaries discussed earlier are usually considered elaborations
of the law, designed to stand as broad principles which may apply
to other situations. The fact that the decisions and academic
commentary concern or emanate from universities may be
considered by some to be incidental (obiter!) to a strictly positivist
or naturalist elaboration of law.
Indeed, some prominent members of the academy are still
working out the repercussions of the 18th-century debate between
the perspectives of natural law and positive law.3 8 Hogg sees judicial
decision-making in terms of a "positivist vs. naturalist" debate. For
him, the positivist side is favoured in approaching such topics as the
Charter due to the danger and failure of Blackstone's type of
natural law. 39 The pursuit of this agenda hardly seems to leave space
for consideration of deconstruction or other modes of criticism.
The fact that the "positivist vs. natural law" debate is still so vibrant,
so dialectical, creates a neutral space between the two well known
and well worn poles which serves to privilege the University further.
38

P. Hogg, "On Being A Positivist: A Reply" (1990) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411.

39 Ibid. at417.
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My purpose is to enlarge the University-Law relationship, or the
positivist-natural law debate, by examining and challenging the
ability of critical-legal theory to mount a credible challenge to this
'neutral' space. So on to the next phase of the discussion.
Black's statistics on the use of academic authority by the
Supreme Court of Canada suggest that the University marketplace
is well frequented by the judiciary. Indeed, while liberalism may be
a "cottage industry," academic citation is industrial sprawl. Black
found that 48 percent of the decisions the Supreme Court of
Canada rendered during the period studied used academic
authority. 40 Although the weight of academic authority in each
judgment is unknown, the frequency of citation is known. 48% is
quite a high number. It makes us immediately want to look at the
source of supply.
But what difference does it make to the "law" whether a
University is a site which it either non-constructs or constructs and
therefore privileges? We find one answer in the realm of judicial
independence and the stake this independence has in ensuring that,
when needed, it can rely on an uncontaminated source of academic
authority for support. But first, let us examine the nature of judicial
independence. The role and function of judicial independence is
well summarized by MacKay:
The function of the judiciary is to adjudicate and resolve
conflicts between individuals and between individuals
and public authorities. Judicial independence from the
legislative and executive branches of the government
ensures that the process of adjudication is uninfluenced
by external political pressures. Preservation of judicial
independence ensures that the public perception of
judicial impartiality is maintained and hence secures
public confidence in the administration of justice. 41

The fact that the courts are seen to be free from external
political influence is key to public confidence in the court and is
fundamental to its authority. MacKay notes that the realm of
judicial independence extends to the court's methods of
administration and deliberation as well as judgment:
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In R. v. Valente it was established that judicial independence
required 'judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear
directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function."
It was held in MacKeigan v. Hickman that it was a violation of the
principle of judicial independence to require judges to disclose
information about their deliberations. 42
The above examples of the rationale for judicial independence
and the court's efforts at achieving judicial independence bear a
striking resemblance to the type of independence we postulate the
"law" non-constructs for the University.
The non-construction and construction of judicial and
academic independence are strikingly similar. Valente' s assertion of
judicial control over administrative decisions strongly resembles
McKinney's reluctance to interfere with the "core" administrative
functions of the University. Hickman's reluctance to provide
information on judicial deliberations strongly reminds us of
Slavutych's finding of evidential privilege between parties at a
University in certain confidential situations. The similarities reflect
the privileges both institutions enjoy in terms of preserving their
independence. This independence is the main ingredient in
fostering public confidence.
Judicial independence and academic independence have more
than just procedural privileges in common. This is not surprising,
since they both depend on public confidence. This may have always
been the case, but we now clearly see that the absolute need for
public confidence in the administration of justice is constitutionally
mandated. 43 Hence, there can be no hint of contamination of the
material that judges canvass in coming to a decision. Confidence is
maintained and contamination is reduced via a variety of legal
methods. For example, where judicial "fact-making" relies on the
testimony of a witness, the court ensures the public's confidence in
the administration of justice through applying established rules of
evidence. Further, substantive law governs the material issues in a
case with the weight of judicial precedent to back the judge up.
Therefore, where the judge feels the need to do his or her own
research, or where the elaboration of the law will be helped
significantly from the use of academic authority, the judge must
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also feel she can draw her research from a pure and similarly
uncontaminated source. This source is the legal academy. This
source would not be available to the court if the legal academy was
merely another government department because this could
introduce bias and subsequently bring the administration of justice
into disrepute when academic work is used by the judiciary. Hence,
the judiciary has a vested interest in creating the privileged place of
the university because it helps shore up the perception of the
independence of the judiciary and thereby preserve public
confidence.
THE USE-VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

But how can the court be sure the academic source is unbiased?
Why do the courts so desperately need this source that they have to
take the kind of metanarrative-destroying risks they needed to take
in McKinney? The answer to the first question is that bias (in the
source of academic commentary) can be eliminated by assigning a
use-value to knowledge. With such a use-value, the consumer of
knowledge is better positioned to make known the specifications
for his needs. Lyotard describes the trend towards knowledge as a
use-value thus:
The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge
to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending,
and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already
taken by the relationship of commodity producers and
consumers to the commodities they produce and
consume-that is, the form of value. 44

As we have seen, the current specifications of academic produce
have served the courts adequately as evidenced by their reluctance
to interfere. In essence, the non-interference of the courts nonconstructs an environment similar to the liberal notion of the free
marketplace of ideas. The net result protects the University from
judicial and government interference. But how is this achieved?
The environment of non judicial-government interference
allows the community of scholars to discuss, debate and draw out
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ideas on various subjects of interest to the law. While there is a risk
that some ideas may be subsumed under others, self-governance
and the freedom of inquiry ensure an environment of free proof, an
environment where demonstration of the merits of one's argument
has few limits. The protection of the courts ensures this
environment will not be constrained by outside political pressures
which may unduly warp the course and perhaps even the outcome
of free inquiry. In essence, the lack of judicial-government
involvement ensures a type of free marketplace of ideas, but with
the difference that even if no one is buying one's intellectual
product, there is still a stall for one to sell, test, and develop one's
wares.
Next, we explore an answer to the second question, why do the
courts so desperately need this source that they have to risk the
kind of disjointed metanarrative as they needed to risk in
McKinney? One answer may lie in the court's need for a reliable
pipeline of authoritative knowledge. Derrida describes justice's
supply-side needs:
But justice, however unpresentable it may be, doesn't
wait. It is that which must not wait. To be direct, simple
and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required
immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with
infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of
conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could
justify it. 45
The use-value of academic commentary finds value as a source of
instant, peer-tested and uncontaminated ideas suitably independent
for the grist mill of the judicial decision-making process. The value
of academic knowledge to the Supreme Court of Canada is not so
much what it is, but that its source of supply is guaranteed to be
pure and immediately accessible through texts or articles without
infinite debate. The stake judicial independence has in academic
independence is high and this makes the need for our inquiry all the
more urgent.
Indeed, the need for our inquiry results from a marked rise in
the use of academic authority. Black notes:
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Regardless of whether one considers the rate of citation
in this six-year period to be high or low, it represents a
notable increase over the rate that prevailed a generation
earlier, a period when, as the Arthurs Report noted,
'[l] egal treatises and articles were seldom cited in
argument or referred to in judgments.' 46

The advent of computer databases, fax machines, and photocopiers
allows for the instantaneous transmission of the use-value of
knowledge and the dissemination of living, 47 ready-made academic
authority to satisfy the Derridean need for quick judgment. This
state of affairs alone makes this paper necessary as an examination
of the shape of these new players at the adversarial moment. The
absence or silence or unawareness of academic indicia point to a gap
in the awareness on the part of the Academy of its enormous
influence. The proposition that it does not presently count itself as
an influence calls for greater scrutiny of its role.
The danger, always, is the re-cloaking of the narrative into a
metanarrative. The danger is noting the influences and then
synthesizing them into objective influences. Derrida sketches this
objectifying process as one which appeals to the idea that the
freedom of the individual is the basis for a just decision. He starts
as follows:
But this freedom or this decision of the just, if it is one,
must follow a law or a prescription, a rule. In this sense, in
its very autonomy, in its freedom to follow or to give
itself laws, it must have the power to be of the calculable
or programmable order, for example as an act of fairness.
But if the act simply consists of applying a rule, of
enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we might
say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps,
by metaphor, that it is just, but we would be wrong to
say that the decision was just.
To be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not
only follow a rule of law or a general law but must also
assume it, approve it, confirm its value, be a reinstituting
act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously
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existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented the
law in every case. No exercise of justice as law can be just
unless there is a "fresh judgment." 48

Derrida describes the dominant paradigm of how justice appears to
arise individually and objectively from the use of mere legal rules or
programs predicated on an individual's freedom to adopt or reject
the rule. The judgment is "fresh" because the judge could have
adopted or rejected the rule or program. By adopting either, the
judge re-presents or re-invents the law. The risk we face here is
allowing the problematized site of the University and academic
authority to slip back into the dominant paradigm of justice. In
other words, the risk consists in taking the view that academic
citation is a "forensic" activity where judges select from among
ready-made objects of truth presented by academic authority in
order to render fresh judgment. To avoid this risk, we should watch
for the indicia of the social construction of judgments and expose
moves denying this.
The tendency for slippage into objectivity in critical theory is all
too familiar. One always has to watch for the "move" back to the
law when the range of possibilities opens too far. The "move"
sometimes involves a grappling with CLS criticism, but in the end
making a strategic move to back privilege the law itself. An
excellent example of the move, provided by MacKay, illustrates
what to look for:
While I do not accept the CLS. argument that judging is
just another form of politics, there is an important
element of choice in Charter adjudication that should not
be obscured. Courts should not assess the wisdom of the
legislation on a purely subjective basis, but they must
assess its wisdom in relation to the standards of the
Charter. If we accept the view that there are as many
versions of the Constitution as there are of Hamlet, the
Charter may not add much in the way of objective
criteria. Without going that far, the Court should
acknowledge that the Charter does take it into the
political realm of measuring the wisdom of a law. 49
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Note the striking similarity between this passage about the Charter
and Hogg's positivist take on the Charter. Hogg has no doubt the
Charter is a positivist institution: "a judge ... should apply the
positive law, which is the Charter as written." 50 Both MacKay and
Hogg take the positivist approach of placing their confidence in the
institution of the Charter as the source of law and its own
interpretation. Both close out the possibility of the alternative form
of influence which is the University itself.
Indeed, this move is well recognized by the crits. For example,
Bakan notes: "In short, Langille and Beatty prescribe that legal
analysts think within law, and avoid thinking about law as a
historical and political phenomenon." 51 But, incredibly, theorists
still advance ways for the system to work within itself. For example,
Beatty, has a theory of constitutional interpretation where "judges
play a role, akin to that of a social critic, evaluating the integritythe morality-of the decisions made by those in control of the legal
powers of the state."5 2 But nowhere to be seen, in all its glorious
absent presence, is the role of the academy at the prior moment to
the adversarial moment, urging on these new roles for judges.
This then points us back to the ever-present question, "the
deeper issue of who controls the discursive agenda, who gets to
determine what is important ... " 53 . I believe this ground will never be
held by any group if one holds of any value the Derridean line that
deconstruction is justice. Take, for example, Jean-Francois
Lyotard's statement: "Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool
of the authorities .... "5 4 Lyotard's perspective portrays
postmodernism as a state of affairs constituted by and practised by
the establishment. The nascent CLS movement, therefore, should
not be viewed as something outside of the mainstream. Rather,
given our example of the ultimate mainstream judiciary, the
Supreme Court of Canada, and its use of the postmodern
framework of drawing attention to the privilege of the University,
we should be able to see that postmodern approaches are

50 Supra note 38 at 417.
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undoubtedly tools of the authorities as well. The fact that the same
tools should be picked up by others, including the CLS, should not
be a surprise. The delegitimizing of the metanarrative quite clearly
is the role of the authorities. Their work at the replacement of the
metanarrative with structural islands of order and non-order, sense
and non-sense, actors and non-actors is now the principle task of the
day.
The revelation and pruning of structure is the principle project
of the day. But sometimes we see the authorities go too far in the
search for legitimization by exposing too many disjointed
structures. We risk right now the danger of being satisfied or
content with the revelation of this disjointed structure: the greater
challenge is probing and usurping the powers which the efficient
structural pruning of the authorities has left behind.
Why does the Supreme Court of Canada need to risk the
postmodern exposure of the privileged place of the University? The
risk is in keeping with the liberal notion of preserving and enhancing
the theory of the marketplace of ideas. Lyotard sees a
corresponding, liberally 'necessary', retreat from the role of the
state in the marketplace of ideas:
The notion that learning falls within the purview of the
state, as the brain or mind of society, will become more
and more outdated with the increasing strength of the
opposing principle, according to which society exists and
progresses only if the messages circulating within it are
rich in information and easy to decode. 55

This "opposing principle" basically ousts the State from
involvement in the knowledge industry. The Supreme Court of
Canada agrees. The messages coming from the University need to
be rich in meaning, easy to decode, and free from the
contaminating influences of the State. In response, all we can say is
that we have just added another institution we need to scrutinize.
This institution, simply put, is the absent presence of the site of
authorizing authority prior to the justiciable moment.
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